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An employer's mileage allowance may be paid at a flat
rate or stated schedule combining fixed and variable rate
(FAVR) payments, both of which must be paid quarterly.
Periodic fixed payments cover projected fixed costs of
driving a standard automobile in connection with the
employee's performance of services in a base locality.
Periodic variable payments cover projected operating costs
under the same assumptions.
A fixed and variable rate allowance may not be paid if
the employee has claimed other than straight line
depreciation on the motor vehicle or claimed expense
method depreciation.
Safe harbor
It is important to remember that a vehicle used during
most of a normal business day directly in connection with
the business of farming may be treated as 75 percent used in
the business plus whatever percentage, if any, is included in
an employee's gross income.18
FOOTNOTES
1 Rev. Proc. 91-67, 1991-2 C.B. 887. See generally 4
Harl, Agricultural Law § 28.02[4][a] (1992).
2 Rev. Proc. 91-67, 1991-2 C.B. 887.
3 Id.
4 Id.  See Rev. Proc. 90-59, 1990-2 C.B. 644; Rev. Proc.
89-62, 1989-2 C.B. 782.
5 Rev. Proc. 83-74, 1983-2 C.B. 593; Rev. Proc. 85-49,
1985-2 C.B. 716.
6 Rev. Proc. 91-67, 1991-2 C.B. 887.
7 Id.
8 I.R.C. § 163(h)(2)(A).
9 I.R.C. § 164.
1 0 Rev. Proc. 91-67,1991-2 C.B. 887.
1 1 Id.
1 2 Rev. Proc. 92-17, I.R.B. 1992-8, 16; Rev. Proc. 89-66,
1989-2 C.B. 792.
1 3 See Rev. Proc. 92-17, I.R.B. 1992-8, 16.
1 4 1989-2 C.B. 792.
1 5 I.R.B. 1992-8, 16.
1 6 Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.274-5T(f)(5)(ii) (including
individuals owning more than 10 percent of stock of
corporation).
1 7 Rev. Proc. 90-34, 1990-1 C.B. 552; Rev. Proc. 91-67,
1991-2 C.B. 887.  See Ltr. Rul. 9117052, Jan. 30, 1991
(plan set up as FAVR but requirements not met).
1 8 Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.274-6T(b).
CASES, REGULATIONS AND STATUTES
by Robert P. Achenbach, Jr.
BANKRUPTCY
  GENERAL  
ADMINISTRATIVE EXPENSES . During the
debtor's long bankruptcy case, the debtor's former wife,
before divorcing the debtor, assisted the estate in post-
petition financing and operating the farm business. The
former spouse filed adminstrative claims for wages and rent
of machinery to the estate but the claims were denied
because the claims were not presented prior to the estate's
filing of the plan. The former spouse's claims for the costs
of other labor were denied because of insufficient records of
the labor provided.  Other claims for machinery rent were
denied because the former spouse failed to demonstrate how
the machinery use benefited the estate or other creditors or
that the former spouse even owned the machinery leased. In
re  Bellman Farms, Inc., 140 B.R. 986 (Bankr.
D. S.D. 1991).
DISCHARGE. The debtor entered into a joint venture
with a creditor to operate a cattle breeding ranch. The
creditor provided the equipment, working capital and real
property.  The debtor was to provide personal services in
operating the ranch and the parties were to split all profits
and losses. After the creditor terminated the joint venture,
several pieces of equipment were found to be missing, the
proceeds of the sale of two steers were missing from the
business account, and the proceeds of the sale of a prize steer
were not deposited in the business account. The court held
that the joint venture placed the debtor in a fiduciary
capacity and that the failure of the debtor to account for all
joint venture property was defalcation; thus, the value of the
missing equipment and one-half (the creditor's share) of the
missing proceeds from the cattle sales were nondischargeable
debts. In re  Shane, 140 B.R. 964 (Bankr. N . D .
Ohio 1992).
ESTATE PROPERTY. The debtors purchased a farm
with another couple with each couple owning an equal
portion as tenants in common.  A portion of the purchase
price was secured by a mortgage.  The other couple later pre-
paid their portion of the mortgage balance and the parties
entered into an agreement which provided that if the debtors
defaulted on their remaining portion of the mortgage, the
other couple could make the payments, with a corresponding
increase in their ownership share of the farm. If the entire
balance of the mortgage was paid by the other couple, the
debtors would be required to assign their entire beneficial
ownership interest in the farm to the other couple.  After
this agreement was entered into, the debtors assigned their
beneficial interest in the farm to a bank as security for
loans.  The bank was also a trustee holding the debtor's
interest in the farm under a land trust.  The farm was leased
to a corporation owned by the son of the other couple with
the rent to be divided according to the parties' beneficial
interests in the farm.  After the debtors defaulted on their
portion of of the real estate taxes and mortgage, the debtors
transferred their beneficial interest in the farm to the other
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couple who then collected all the rent from the lease.  The
estate sought recovery of the debtors' portion of the rents
collected after the filing of the bankruptcy petition.
Although the court held that the debtors retained a sufficient
interest in the farm to claim the rents received post-petition,
the court held that the agreement between the couple was
enforceable as between the debtors and the other couple,
even though the bank had already been assigned the debtor's
beneficial interest in the farm.  Therefore, the debtors did not
have any enforcable right to the rents after the other couple
paid the delinquent taxes and defaulted mortgage payments.
Matter of Drewry, 966 F.2d 236 (7th Cir .
1992), aff'g unrep. D. Ct. dec. aff'g , 99 B . R .
206 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 1990).
EXECUTORY CONTRACTS . The debtors had
entered into a land installment contract which became part of
the bankruptcy estate.  The trustee filed a motion to assume
the contract and planned to sell the debtors' interest in the
property to a third party. The court held that the contract
was an assumable executory contract under Section 365(a).
The debtors argued that the contract was not assumable
under Section 365(c) because the contract required the
personal services of the debtors.  The court held that the land
installment contract was not a personal services contract and
allowed the trustee to assume the contract. In re  Raby,
139 B.R. 833 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1991).
EXEMPTIONS.
TOOLS OF THE TRADE. The debtors lived in a
mobile home on property owned by one debtor's parent. The
debtors used their farm equipment to do custom combining
and other work for other farmers. The debtors sought to
exempt farm machinery and equipment under 31 Okla. Stat.
§§  1(A)(5) and (A)(6).  Section 1(A)(5) provided an
exemption for implements of husbandry necessary to farm
the homestead.  The court held that this section did not
apply because the debtors did not own any land farmed or
lived on by them.  Section 1(A)(6) allowed an exemption
for tools used in a trade.  A creditor argued that this
exemption was not available because farm equipment was
exempted only under Section 1(A)(5). The court held that
custom combining was a trade and that farm machinery
could be exempted under this provision.  The court noted
that although a farmer could have the advantage of the use of
both exemptions, the statute allowed only a total of $5,000
per person, thus limiting the total exemptions fairly among
all debtors. The case involved the certification of questions
from a federal District Court. Lindsey v. Kingfisher
Bank & Trust Co., 832 P.2d 1 (Okla. 1992).
  CHAPTER 13  
PLAN. The Chapter 13 plan proposed to pay unsecured
creditors 6 percent of their claims. A creditor with a
mortgage on the debtor's house objected to the plan as not
paying as much as would be received in a Chapter 7
liquidation. As to the residence, the debtor had taken the fair
market value and subtracted the costs of sale as 10 percent,
including broker's fees, attorney's fees, closing costs and
capital gains taxes.  The creditor argued that a Chapter 7
trustee would be able to use the $125,000 gains exclusion
on the residence which was available to the debtor who was
over 55.  The debtor's spouse was not a debtor in the case.
The court held that the plan could determine the amount of
proceeds of a Chapter 7 liquidation of the residence by
deducting the costs of sale.  The costs would include the tax
on any capital gain because the $125,000 exclusion would
not be available to the trustee because the nondebtor spouse
would not be involved in the bankruptcy case and could not
be forced to join in the election. In re Dixon, 140 B . R .
945 (Bankr. W.D. N.Y. 1992).
  FEDERAL TAXATION  
CORPORATIONS. Under I.R.C. § 382(a), if a loss
corporation has an ownership change during a Chapter 11
case, the amount of the corporation's taxable income for a
post-change taxable year that can be offset by pre-change
losses and credits is limited to the value of the corporation
multiplied by the long-term tax exempt rate. The IRS has
issued proposed regulations governing the increase in the
value of the loss corporation resulting from the exchange of
stock for debt. See I.R.C. § 382(l)(6).  The proposed
regulations provide that the value of a loss corporation is
the lesser of the value of the stock immediately after the
ownership change and the value of the corporation's assets
before the change. Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.382-3(j) .
This allows the corporation to increase its value for direct as
well as indirect exchanges of stock for debt.
However, the new rule does not apply to the extent stock
is issued with the principal purpose of increasing the value
of the corporation without subjecting the investment to the
entrepreneurial risks of corporate business operations.
Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.382-3(k)(6) . 57 Fed. R e g .
34736 (Aug. 6, 1992).
TAX LIENS.  The debtor corporation had granted a
security interest in corporation property to an officer of the
corporation and the security interest was perfected by a filing
in Texas where the corporation had its headquarters.  The
security interest was not refiled in Georgia after the
corporation moved to that state. After the move to Georgia,
the corporation granted to a bank a security interest in a
truck purchased by the corporation using the funds borrowed
from the bank.  This security interest was perfected by the
bank's obtaining of the certificate of title from the Georgia
Department of Revenue.  A federal tax lien was filed against
the corporation's property after the move to Georgia and
after the purchase of the truck.  The court held that the
officer's failure to refile the security interest in Georgia
within four months after the move caused the security
interest to become unperfected and subordinate to the
subsequently filed federal tax lien.  The court also held that
the purchase money security interest of the bank had priority
over the tax lien because the security interest was perfected.
Matter of Specialty Contracting & Supply, Inc. ,
140 B.R. 922 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1992).
FEDERAL
AGRICULTURAL
PROGRAMS
COTTON. The AMS has adopted as final regulations
revising the classification of cotton to provide for the
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separation of grade into its chief components of color and
leaf. The revised regulations also eliminate the descriptive
standards for Light Gray, Gray and Plus grades and the
averaging rule. 57 Fed. Reg. 34495 (Aug. 5, 1992).
POULTRY INSPECTION. The plaintiffs were
poultry growers' associations who challenged the regulations
providing standards on imported poultry. Under the 1985
Farm Bill, 21 U.S.C. § 466(d) was amended to require that
imported poultry be subject to the same standards of
inspection and processing as domestic poultry. The FSIS
issued regulations governing imported poultry to provide
that such poultry be processed in facilities meeting standards
of inspection and sanitation "at least equal to" those in the
U.S. The regulatory language "at least equal to" was retained
although several members of Congress filed written
objections and the 1990 Farm Bill contained findings and
sense of Congress provisions declaring that the "at least
equal to" language did not meet the statutory requirement of
"as same as." The court held that the regulations were
invalid and unenforceable as violating the statutory
requirement that standards for imported poultry be the same
as standards for domestic poultry. Mississippi Poultry
Ass'n, Inc. v. Madigan, 790 F. Supp. 1 2 8 3
(S.D. Miss. 1992).
FEDERAL ESTATE AND
GIFT TAX
GENERATION SKIPPING TRANSFERS . In
1976, the taxpayer received an interest in trust from a
predeceased spouse which gave the taxpayer a general power
of appointment over the trust corpus. In 1976, the taxpayer
disclaimed a portion of the power of appointment such that
the taxpayer retained only a power to appoint trust property
to the issue of the taxpayer and the predeceased spouse, the
spouses of the issue, and charities. The taxpayer executed a
will which appointed the trust corpus to trusts for the
taxpayer's children with remainders to other descendants. The
appointment clause provided that either all interests in the
trusts must vest within 21 years of a life in being at the
death of the taxpayer or the trusts are to terminate by that
time. The IRS ruled that the marital trust was irrevocable
prior to 1985 and that the testamentary exercise of the
special power of appointment would not subject the trust to
GSTT. Ltr. Rul. 9229018, April 17, 1992.
MARITAL DEDUCTION. The taxpayer's will
provided for distribution of estate property to a marital trust.
The will provided that the trust was to be the primary
beneficiary of any IRA or pension plans owned by the
taxpayer at death. The marital trustee was to distribute from
the IRA distributions, at least annually, an amount equal to
the income earned by the IRA.  If the IRA distributed less
than its income for a taxable year, the trustee was to demand
additional distributions from the IRA to at least equal the
IRA income. The IRS ruled that the interest in the IRA
account which passed to the marital trust would be QTIP,
even though the IRA would make distributions to the
trustee before distributions would be made by the trustee to
the surviving spouse. Ltr. Rul. 9229017, April 1 7 ,
1992 .
At death, the decedent owned an interest in an annuity
which was to have begun payments to the decedent six years
after the decedent's death. The surviving spouse was the
remainder beneficiary of the annuity contracts which
provided five options for payments: (1) a lump sum; (2) a
lifetime monthly annuity; (3) monthly payments for the
lifetime of the spouse, with payments after the surviving
spouse's death to a beneficiary named by the spouse for a
total period of 10 or 20 years; (4) monthly payments for a
guaranteed period, with payments after the surviving
spouse's death to a beneficiary named by the spouse for the
remainder of the guaranteed period; and (5) interest only
payments for the life of the spouse or guaranteed period,
with payments after the surviving spouse's death to a
beneficiary named by the spouse for the remainder of the
guaranteed period. The IRS ruled that all of the options were
terminable interests eligible for the marital deduction
without a QTIP election. The IRS also ruled that if the
surviving spouse named a remainder payee under the last
four options, a taxable gift would occur. Ltr. R u l .
9229034, April 22, 1992.
The decedent's 1968 will bequeathed property to the
surviving spouse to the extent of the maximum marital
deduction "to the extent of the federal estate tax laws in
effect at my death." The IRS ruled that the marital bequest
was not a formula clause and the estate was eligible for the
unlimited marital deduction because the clause was a specific
indication that the decedent intended the changes in federal
estate tax law to apply to the bequest. Ltr. R u l .
9231012, April 12, 1992.
SPECIAL USE VALUATION. The House Ways
and Means Committee has reported a bill, H.R. 5647,
which would apply the 10-year recapture period for special
use valuation property for decedents who died before 1982.
The Miscellaneous Revenue Act of 1992 (in proposed
form) includes a provision allowing estates which make the
special use valuation election and file the recapture
agreement to perfect the election by providing any missing
signature on the agreement within 90 days after the IRS
requests the signature.  H.R. 11, § 4706.
The decedent's estate made a protective special use
valuation election on a timely filed estate tax return.  The
estate later determined that a special use valuation election
was available and filed an amended return making the
election. During an examination of the amended return, the
IRS agreed to an increase in estate tax liability due to an
increase in property not subject to the special use valuation
election.  The IRS ruled that the estate was still eligible to
make the special use valuation election. Ltr. R u l .
9230002, April 9, 1992.
TRUSTS. The taxpayer transferred partnership interests
to a trust for the taxpayer's spouse. The independent trustee
had the discretion to distribute trust income and principal for
the "pleasure, happiness or such other purpose" as the
trustee deemed in the beneficiary's general welfare.  The
taxpayer had the power to remove the trustee without cause
and to substitute anyone else, including the taxpayer, as
successor trustee.  The IRS ruled that the taxpayer was
considered the owner of the trust income and corpus because
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the trustee discretion to distribute income and principal was
not subject to an ascertainable standard. Therefore, the
adjusted basis and holding periods of the contributed
partnership interest were the same before and after
contribution to the trust and Section 1041(a) did not apply
to the transfer in trust to the taxpayer's spouse although the
amount of partnership liabilities associated with the
partnership interests exceeded the taxpayer's basis in the
partnership interests. Ltr. Rul. 9230021, April 2 8 ,
1992 .
VALUATION. The decedent's estate included property
in a trust which included a 77 percent undivided interest in
the decedent's residence. Also included in the estate was
leased real property which contained underground storage
tanks which, on the alternate valuation date, showed no
evidence of leaks.  The estate valued the interest in the
residence at 77 percent of fair market value less a 15 percent
fractional interest discount.  The estate also argued that the
value of the leased property should have been discounted for
the possibility of leaks in the tanks.  The court held that the
15 percent fractional discount would be applied because the
fractional interest would have a general lack of control, lack
of marketability, illiquidity and partitioning expenses.  The
discount in value of the leased property was not allowed
because no evidence of leaks appeared at the date of
valuation of the property. Est. of Pillsbury v .
Comm'r, T.C. Memo. 1992-425.
The taxpayer owned 90 percent of the corporation's
preferred stock and the taxpayer's child owned the rest of the
preferred stock and all common stock. All stock was entitled
to one vote but if the preferred stock were to be transferred
other than to an unrelated party in a bona fide sale, the
voting rights of the transferred stock would cease upon
transfer.  The stock transfer provision was in effect prior to
October 9, 1990. The taxpayer transferred 1,000 shares of
preferred stock to the child. The IRS ruled that the stock
transfer was not subject to I.R.C. § 2701 because the
transferor's interest in the corporation was of the same class,
preferred stock, as the retained interest in the corporation.
The IRS also ruled that the transfer was not subject to
I.R.C. § 2704(a) because the lapse of voting rights was
pursuant to a restriction placed on the stock prior to October
9, 1990. Ltr. Rul. 9229028, April 21, 1992.
FEDERAL INCOME
TAXATION
EMPLOYEE. The taxpayer was a business which
leased trucks with drivers to clients who were contract
carriers. The taxpayer was responsible for all costs involved
in operating the truck. The drivers are not given training or
instructions but the taxpayer had the right to change the
budgetary methods used by the drivers. The drivers were paid
on a percentage commission basis, worked under the
direction of the clients, and were responsible for the
operation and care of the trucks while in the drivers'
possession. The drivers did not receive sick pay, insurance
or paid vacations and the taxpayer did not deduct federal
employment taxes from the compensation paid to the
drivers. The drivers' services were provided under the
taxpayer's business name and the employment relationship
could be terminated by either party without liability. The
IRS ruled that the drivers were employees for federal
employment tax withholding purposes. Ltr. R u l .
9231006, April 28, 1992.
HOBBY LOSSES . Loss deductions from a cattle
raising activity were disallowed where the taxpayer did not
operate the activity in a businesslike manner, did not keep
adequate books and did not seek expert advice on cattle
raising. Lujan v. Comm'r, T.C. Memo. 1992-417.
INSTALLMENT REPORTING. The taxpayer
reported income from a real estate construction and sales
business on the accrual method. In two consecutive taxable
years, the taxpayer reported the entire gain from two sales in
the taxable year of the sale, except the sale in the first
taxable year was also reported in the second taxable year.
After an audit of those years had begun, the taxpayer
requested that the election out of installment reporting be
revoked, arguing that the double reporting indicated that the
taxpayer actually intended to use installment reporting of the
gain. The IRS ruled that the revocation would not be
allowed because of evidence that the taxpayer wanted to
change the election to defer gain to years in which excess
losses could be offset against the gain. The IRS ruled that
this was insufficient motive for revoking the election. Ltr.
Rul. 9230003, April 10, 1992.
INVESTMENT TAX CREDIT. The taxpayer
purchased compressed gas cylinders and leased the cylinders
to unrelated parties under five-year leases which were
renewable from year to year after the first five years unless
terminated by giving 12 months' prior notice.  The
taxpayers were denied investment tax credit because the
leases were for an indefinite period because the leases could
be continued until terminated by the parties.  Russell v .
Comm'r, 92-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 5 0 , 3 8 4
(7th Cir. 1992), aff'g , T.C. Memo. 1991-269.
The taxpayers moved several 40 year old houses to a
historic office subdivision and rehabilitated them, retaining
over 75 percent of the existing external walls.  The court
held that the taxpayers were not entitled to rehabilitation
credit for the houses because the houses were not
rehabilitated in their original locations. Nalle v .
Comm'r, 99 T.C. No. 9 (1992).
The taxpayer leased warehouse shelving under a lease
which provided reciprocal purchase and sale options to the
parties.  The court held that the taxpayer was not entitled to
depreciation deductions or investment tax credit as to the
leased property because the lease removed the risk of
depreciation as well as the benefits of appreciation for the
property. Kwiat v. Comm'r, T.C. Memo. 1992-
433 .
IRA'S. The decedent had established a qualified Section
401(a) pension plan which named the decedent's estate as
sole beneficiary. The surviving spouse was the decedent's
sole heir under the decedent's will and the estate elected to
receive the amount in the pension plan in a lump sum
distribution which would be distributed to the surviving
spouse within one taxable year. The surviving spouse
established an IRA for the purpose of receiving the pension
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plan distribution within 60 days after distribution.  The IRS
ruled that the contribution to the IRA from the pension plan
distribution would qualify for rollover treatment under
Section 408(a). Ltr. Rul. 9229022, April 20, 1992.
PARTNERSHIPS
ADMINISTRATIVE ADJUSTMENTS. The taxpayers,
husband and wife equal partners, argued that their partnership
was not eligible for the small partnership exception to the
administrative adjustment rules because not all partnership
items were shared equally between the partners as required by
I.R.C. § 6231(a)(1), the "same-share" rule. The taxpayers
argued that Treas. Reg. § 301.6231(a)(1)-1(a)(3) was invalid
because it excluded some partnership items from
consideration of whether the partners shared partnership
items equally. The court held that regulation to be a valid
implementation of the statute because the excluded items,
such as guaranteed payments to a specific partner, did not
have a direct tax effect on all partners. McKnight v .
Comm'r, 99 T.C. No. 8 (1992).
DEFINITION. The IRS has issued proposed regulations
amending the limited partnership definition rules concerning
the element of continuity of life. The proposed regulations
provide that a limited partnership lacks continuity of life
notwithstanding that a dissolution may be avoided by at
least the remaining general partners agreeing to continue the
partnership in the event of the withdrawal of a general
partner, for whatever reason. Prop. Treas. Reg. §
301.7701-2(b)(1) .
A general partnership registered as a limited liability
partnership under Texas law.  The partnership agreement
provided that a partner's interest in the partnership could not
be transferred, assigned or encumbered without consent of
the partnership. Because of this agreement provision, the
IRS ruled that the partnership lack the corporate
characteristic of free transferability of interests.  The state
limited partnership act provided that all partners are agents
of the partnership unless the partner had no such authority
under the partnership agreement and the person with whom
the partner was dealing had knowledge of the partner's lack
of authority. The IRS ruled that because of this provision,
the partnership lacked the corporate characteristic of
centralization of management.  The IRS ruled that because
the partnership lacked two of the four corporate
characteristics, the partnership would be considered a
partnership for federal income tax purposes.  The IRS also
ruled that the partnership's registration as a limited liability
partnership did not cause a termination of the partnership.
Ltr. Rul. 9229016, April 16, 1992.
RETURN PREPARERS. The accountant of a
partnership prepared the Schedule K-1 for several partners
whose individual returns substantially understated gross
income.  The accountant was assessed the $500 penalty of
I.R.C. § 6694(b) as a preparer of the partners' individual
returns. The court acknowledged the rule that a person is
considered a preparer of a return if the person prepares a
schedule which comprises a substantial portion of the
return.  The accountant was found not to be the preparer of
the partners' individual returns because the returns were
complicated, with the Schedule K-1's being a subordinate
portion of the items constituting the returns. Drobny v .
U.S., 92-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 5 0 , 3 7 8
(N.D. Ill. 1992).
PENSION PLANS . The IRS has issued a revenue
procedure providing model language for use in executive
unfunded deferred compensation arrangements, so-called
"Rabbi trusts."  The revenue procedure also provides
guidance for requesting rulings on nonqualified deferred
compensation plans that use such trusts. Rev. Proc. 9 2 -
64, I.R.B. 1992-33, 23.
PRE-PAID FEED EXPENSES . The taxpayer, a
physician, purchased cattle and sold them after having the
cattle fed at third party feedlots.  The IRS had disallowed the
deductions for a substantial portion of feed purchased by the
taxpayer late in two taxable years.  The IRS argued that the
taxpayer was prohibited from currently deducting the feed
expenses because the taxpayer was a farming syndicate under
I.R.C. § 464. The court held that the taxpayer was not an
active participant in a farming operation as to the feedlots
because the taxpayer did not (1) participate in the
management of the feedlots, (2) work in the feedlots, (3)
live in the feedlots, or (4) hire or fire employees of the
feedlots.  The taxpayer was found to be merely a customer
of the feedlots which contracted for feeding services as
independent contractors.  The court also held that the
taxpayer's involvement as a buyer and seller of cattle was
not a farming enterprise because the taxpayer was not
involved in the raising, feeding, caring for or management
of the cattle, but was merely an investor. Finally, the court
held that the taxpayer had limited liability in the business
because the taxpayer invested in a 100 percent hedge in the
cattle futures market. Therefore, the taxpayer was held to be
a limited entrepreneur not actively involved in a farming
operation and not entitled to currently deduct pre-paid feed
expenses in the taxable year before the taxable year in which
the feed was actually used. Est. of Wallace v .
Comm'r, 965 F.2d 1038 (11th Cir. 1992).
RESPONSIBLE PERSON . The taxpayers were the
president and sole shareholder of a corporation which
operated a hotel and the manager of the hotel. After the
corporation became delinquent on withheld employment
taxes, the taxpayers and IRS reached an agreement on
payment of the delinquent taxes.  Before the entire amount
could be paid, the corporation's creditors foreclosed against
all of the corporation's property. The taxpayers were
assessed the 100 percent penalty under I.R.C. 6672 for the
unpaid amount. The court held that the president was a
responsible person in that the president had the power to
write checks and ordered payment of the taxes when the
president learned that the taxes were delinquent.  The
manager was held to be a responsible person because the
manager hired and fired employees and was responsible for
payment of wages.  The court also held that the failure to
pay the taxes by both taxpayers was willful because neither
paid the taxes when known to be due.  The payment
agreement did not absolve the taxpayers of the willful failure
to pay the taxes. Muck v. U.S., 791 F. Supp. 8 1 7
(D. Colo. 1992).
S CORPORATIONS
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ADMINISTRATIVE ADJUSTMENTS. The IRS filed a
timely FSAA with all shareholders of the S corporation
except the taxpayer. No review of the FSAA was sought by
the tax matters person or noticed shareholders. Notice of the
FSAA was untimely sent to the taxpayer.  The court held
that because the Subchapter S tax items became non-
subchapter S items on the date of the untimely notice to the
taxpayer, the statute of limitations on the assessment of
those tax items was extended one year from the date of the
notice to the taxpayer.  Aufleger v. Comm'r, 99 T . C .
No. 5 (1992).
WAGES. Payments made by a real estate developer to a
brother were not compensation but were gifts excluded from
self-employment income where the brother was not expected
to provide services for the developer and the payments were
not made for any business purpose. Hughes v. Comm'r,
T.C. Memo. 1992-438.
LANDLORD AND TENANT
TERMINATION. In 1988 the parties entered into an
oral lease to farm 560 acres for growing wheat. On August
30, 1988, the landlord sent written notice to the tenant
terminating the lease as of August 1, 1989. Under Kans.
Stat. § 58-2506(a), an oral lease can be terminated only by
written notice at least 30 days before March 1 and must fix
the termination date as March 1.  However, under Kan. Stat.
§ 58-2506(b), the actual termination date for fall seeded
crops is the date of harvest or August 1.  Thus, the
landlord's notice used the actual date and not the statutory
date in the notice. The court held that the notice was
effective because it substantially complied with the statutory
requirements and purposes. Mendenhall v. Roberts,
831 P.2d 568 (Kan. Ct. App. 1992).
NUISANCE
HOG FARM . The plaintiffs had lived next to the
defendant's grain farm for over six years when the defendants
started a hog raising operation on their property. The
plaintiffs filed a private nuisance action against the
defendants in an attempt to abate the odors from the hog
operation. The court held that the right-to-farm statute did
not apply because the plaintiffs had lived next to the
defendant for six years before the defendant made a
significant change in their operations by starting the alleged
nuisance.  However, because conflicting evidence was
presented as to whether the hog operation caused any harm
to the plaintiffs, the appellate court was required to uphold
the trial court's finding that the defendant's hog operation
was not a nuisance. Wendt v. Kerkhof, 594 N.E.2d
795 (Ind. Ct. App. 1992).
RIPARIAN RIGHTS
LEVEE. The defendants constructed a levee on their
farm which caused increased drainage of water onto the
plaintiff's land from a river bordering both properties. More
than five years after the construction of the levee, the
plaintiff brought an action for money damages and an
injunction to remove the levees.  The trial court had ruled
that the five year statute of limitations for an action
involving injury to real property prevented the action for
money damages. The court of appeals then held that the
injunction action was barred by the doctrine of laches
because the plaintiff waited too long to bring the action after
damages started. The Illinois Supreme court reversed as to
both rulings, holding that where the damage from a
permanent structure produces continuing water damage to a
servient property by increasing water flow, the five year
statute of limitations only limits the damages recoverable to
the five years prior to the filing of the action, but does not
prevent the action itself. The Court also reversed the laches
ruling because a prescriptive right to flood land belonging to
another does not accrue until after 20 years of adverse and
uninterrupted flooding known to the servient landowner.
Meyers v. Kissner, 594 N.E.2d 336 (Ill. 1992 ) ,
rev'g , 576 N.E.2d 1094 (Ill. Ct. App. 1990).
TRANSFER OF WATER RIGHTS. The
defendant owned a decreed right to divert creek water for
irrigation of 96 acres of farm land and applied for a new
water diversion permit and for a transfer of the original right
to irrigate different land. The plaintiff, a junior water rights
holder, objected to the applications on the basis that some
of the original water rights had been forfeited by nonuse and
that the new permit would injure senior water rights. The
court upheld the decision of the Director of the Department
of Water Resources approving the transfer and permit which
placed restrictions on the defendant's water use to ensure that
senior water rights were not diminished.  The decision
allowed the additional diversion only during high water
when the water flow exceeded all water rights and placed
measuring devices on the defendant's diversion access.
Dovel v. Dobson, 831 P.2d 527 (Idaho 1992).
SECURED
TRANSACTIONS
REPOSSESSION . The debtor had granted a security
interest in a one-fourth interest in a race horse to a bank to
secure a loan.  After the debtor defaulted on payments on the
loan, the bank offset amounts in the debtor's checking
accounts and sued for the balance.  Another bank which held
security interests in the remainder of the race horse proposed
a sale of the horse to which the debtor's bank agreed.  The
bank informed the debtor that one-fourth of the proceeds of
the sale would be applied against the loan balance. The
horse died before the sale.  The debtor argued that the bank's
statements shifted the burden of loss from the death of the
horse to the bank.  The court held that the bank had no
actual or constructive possession of the horse and, therefore,
had no obligation for the health of the horse. The debtor was
not allowed to reduce the loan balance by one-fourth of the
value of the horse. Liberty Nat'l Bank & Trust v .
Ginn, 832 P.2d 33 (Okla. Ct. App. 1992).
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STATE TAXATION
AGRICULTURAL USE . The taxpayer purchased
agricultural land with the intent to eventually develop a
residential subdivision. The land was annexed to the
neighboring town and zoned as a planned unit development.
The taxpayers pledged their water rights in the land to the
town.  The taxpayers leased the land to two ranchers for low
rent which included uncompensated use of the water. The
court held that the taxpayers were entitled to have the land
taxed as agricultural land because the actual use of the land
for the taxable year and two previous years was for
agricultural purposes, even though the taxpayers themselves
did not farm or ranch the land and the tenants may not have
made a profit in their operations. Boulder County Bd.
of Equal. v. M.D.C. Const. Co., 830 P.2d 9 7 5
(Colo. 1992).
CITATION UPDATES
Mostowy v. U.S., 966 F.2d 668 (Fed. Cir .
1992), aff 'g , 24 Cl. Ct. 193 (1991)  (capital gains),
see p. 118 supra.
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